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NEW MEXICO'S SUMMARY CALENDAR FOR
DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: AN INVITATION
FOR INEFFICIENCY, INEFFECTIVENESS AND INJUSTICE
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
As increasing appellate caseloads strain judicial and support resources available to appellate courts, the incentive for streamlining
and expediting the appellate process to accommodate the needs of
courts, counsel and litigants also increases. Traditional means for
increasing work output, such as addition of judgeships and legal and
clerical support staff, are often compromised by general funding
problems facing many state jurisdictions, as well as the federal government. As a consequence, alternative means for expediting are
sought, including reduction of judicial time involved for review of
individual cases, restriction of oral argument and limitations on discretionary review. At the same time, fiscal pressures have focused
attention on reduction of costs of reproduction of the record of trial
as a means of recovering and rediverting financial resources toward
the disposition process. One approach in addressing the overall picture,
which includes the problems posed by delay, record production costs
and scarcity of judicial resources, lies in the creation of summary
disposition procedures. The summary calendaring of cases, relied on
heavily by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in managing its criminal
docket, may be seen as an important step in expediting the appellate
process with attendant reductions in direct economic costs and allocation of judicial resources. However, the system poses serious
constitutional questions for the integrity of the appellate process in
criminal cases, as argued in this article.
Significant increases in appellate caseloads and strains placed ution
already limited judicial resources have given rise to reliance on both
traditional and innovative measures designed to control "dockets" and
ease the effects of backlog. Dramatic action, such as the creation of
intermediate appellate courts' and shifting decisionmaking authority, 2 have

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. Member,
New Mexico Bar; Appellate Defender, New Mexico Public Defender Department, 1983-84.
1. For an interesting treatment of the history and role of the New Mexico Court of Appeals,
see Thomas A. Donnelly and Pamela B. Minzer, History of the New Mexico Court of Appeals,
22 N.M. L. REV. 595 (1992); Taylor Mattis, PrecedentialValue of Decisions of the Court of Appeals
for the State of New Mexico, 22 N.M. L. REV. 535 (1992).
2. For example, in 1981, jurisdiction over direct appeals in non-capital criminal cases shifted
from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to the state's fourteen intermediate appellate courts,
previously designated by the state constitution as Courts of Civil Appeals. The constitutional
amendment and resulting change in appellate procedure was necessitated both by the sheer volume
of criminal appeals taken and growth in backlog of cases from 1904 undecided cases at the end
of 1977 to 2507 in 1978 to 3238 at the end of 1979 in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Robert W.
Calvert, For Amendment Number 8, 43 TEX. B.J. 910 (1980); see e.g., Carl E.F. Dally & Patricia
A. Brockway, Changes in Appellate Review following the 1980 Constitutional Amendment, 13 ST.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

marked attempts to address the problem in some jurisdictions.3 Other
jurisdictions have sought to streamline the appellate-decisionmaking process4
or expand available resources to promote prompt disposition of appellate
cases.
The most important factor in the national expansion of appellate court
caseload is the increased availability of appellate review for indigent
criminal defendants as a consequence of major United States Supreme
Court decisions over the past three decades. 5 The New Mexico Constitution, as opposed to the Federal Constitution, expressly provides for a
right of appeal 6 which ensures that all aggrieved criminal defendants may

seek appellate review of their convictions in state court.
The tension created by a rapidly expanding caseload has two immediate
consequences for maintenance of an orderly system of appellate disposition. First, it increases the burden on both institutional counsel-prosecution and defense counsel employed by agencies of government-and
the appellate courts in terms of attorney and judge-hours which must
be devoted to case disposition. Second, to the extent that caseload increases
outstrip available lawyer and judge-hours devoted to case processing, the
expanding caseload almost necessarily results in a pattern of increasing
delay in the disposition time for resolving appeals. 7
The impact of these factors may devastate even the most thoughtfullycreated appellate systems, since optimal caseload performance for both
attorneys and judges can seldom be maintained without significant expansion of resources in terms of staffing. 8 Staffing increases, however,

MARY'S L.J. 211 (1981); Robert Huttash et al., Review of the Creation and Enactment of Post-

Trial and Appellate Statutes and Rules Applicable to Criminal Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 843
(1981)(both articles discussing constitutional amendment shifting appellate jurisdiction in Texas noncapital appeals to intermediate courts of appeals and repositioning Court of Criminal Appeals as
court exercising discretionary jurisdiction in non-capital cases).
3. For example, the problem of appellate backlog in Florida has been addressed by constitutional
amendment designed to restrict the jurisdiction of the state supreme court and enforce reliance on
intermediate appellate court decisions as essentially final decisions in most appeals. John M. Scheb
& John M. Scheb, I1, Making Intermediate Appellate Courts Final: Assessing JurisdictionalChanges
in Florida'sAppellate Courts, 67 JUDICATURE 474, 477 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Charles G. Douglas, Ill, Innovative Appellate Court Processing: New Hampshire's
Experience with Summary Affirmance, 69 JUDICATURE 147 (1985) (discussing New Hampshire appellate
process which dispensed with filing of record on appeal until review certified by state supreme
court). The New Hampshire procedure was declared violative of due process in Bundy v. Wilson,
815 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1987), however, based on the First Circuit's conclusion that denial of access
to the trial transcript or alternative means of arguing merits of appeal frustrated the constitutional
standard for fairness. Id. at 134.
5. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 747 n.l (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (tracing history
of recent decisions of Supreme Court and demonstrating that Court now accepts right of appeal
from state criminal convictions as inferred from federal constitutional guarantees).
6. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
7. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.40 (ABA 1986). The Commentary to
Standard 3.40 notes: "An appellate court must have an adequate complement of judges, supporting
staff, and necessary facilities. The prolonged delay in disposition of appeals, the curtailment of
oral argument, and the pressure of time under which appellate deliberations must often be conducted,
are an important part the consequence of gross inadequacies in this respect."
8. Even an increase in staff members poses risks to the intellectual integrity of the appellate
process as case management comes to dominate the work of the court, rather than thoughtful
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almost necessarily follow evidence of demand or need for additional
staff. 9 When needed expansion of judicial or staff resources is unduly
slow or inadequate, the system is likely to become mired in delay in
disposition resulting from the increasing accumulated workload of actors
in the system.
One significant consequence which may result from increasing caseloads
that is not addressed adequately or quickly with expanded resources is
the tendency of the criminal appellate docket to take precedence over
civil matters. This may be the result of a conscious plan or it may be
the unstated need to finalize criminal matters expeditiously. Some state
appellate systems address this tension by creating specialized appellate
courts devoted to criminal matters, 0 such as the Courts of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma" and Texas,' 2 the courts of last resort in criminal
cases in those states, or intermediate courts of criminal appeals operating
in Alabama, 3 Alaska' 4 and Tennessee.'" New Mexico, consistent with the
more common national practice, has retained general appellate jurisdiction
in the court of appeals, rather than moving toward a system of specialization. 16

consideration of the issues presented and the requirements of justice. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard,
Jr., Are Heavy Caseloads Changing the Nature of Appellate Justice?, 66 JUDICATURE 57 (1982).
The author expresses concern for "assembly line justice" dictated by increasing appellate caseloads
in observing: "Modernization is a code word for mass production and expansion. Inevitably, it
also implies bureaucratization, formality, and delegation of authority in the internal operation of
intermediate courts. As administrative values rise, decisions are legitimated less by hand crafted
appeals." Id. at 59.
9. Moreover, increasing reliance on staff attorneys, rather than law clerks, may pose significant
threats of compromise of the collective legal judgment of appellate justices. One study suggested
the extremely high rate of agreement between staff counsel recommendations and final decisions
reflects too much reliance on staff for appellate decisionmaking. Mary Lou Stow & Harold J.
Spaeth, Centralized Research Staff. Is There a Monster in the Judicial Closet?, 75 JUDICATURE 216,
220 (1992).
10. For an interesting and brief discussion of the merits of specialized courts of criminal appeals,
see Stanley Mosk & Gerald F. Uelmen, Opinion/Dissent: A Two-Part State Supreme Court, II
PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1983). California Supreme Court Justice Mosk argued the desirability of separating
criminal and civil review within the state supreme court, while Professor Uelmen argued for other
mechanisms, including limitations on the flow of cases into the state supreme court; use of en banc
review procedure in the courts of appeals; shifting primary responsibility for death penalty review
to the courts of appeals; eliminating the traditional de novo appeal for cases taken from the courts
of appeals; and eliminating supreme court original jurisdiction of extraordinary writs. Professor
Uelmen felt these methods were preferable to splitting the work of the state supreme court justices.
11. OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 35 (1981) (creation of Court of Criminal
Appeals); tit. 20, § 40 (defining appellate jurisdiction), and tit. 20, § 41 (defining jurisdiction to
include habeas corpus).
12. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (creating Court of Criminal Appeals) and § 5 (defining jurisdiction
of Court of Criminal Appeals).
13. ALA. CONST. amend. 328; ALA. CODE (1925) § 12-3-1 (creating Court of Criminal Appeals);
§ 12-3-9 (defining jurisdiction to include appellate review of misdemeanor and felony convictions,
habeas corpus and post-conviction writs).
14. This appellate court's jurisdiction is defined by ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.010-.030 (1988). For
a discussion of the operation of the Alaska Court of Appeals, which hears only criminal appellate
matters, see Susanne Di Pietro, The Development of Appellate Sentence Review in Alaska, 75
JUDICATURE 143 (1991).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-5-101 (1980) (creating Court of Criminal Appeals); § 16-5-108 (defining
jurisdiction to include felony and misdemeanor appellate jurisdiction and jurisdiction over habeas
corpus and other writs, but expressly excluding jurisdiction in action solely to determine constitutionality of a state statute or municipal ordinance in subsection (c)).
16. N.M. R. APP. PRoc. 12-102(B) provides that all appeals are taken to the Court of Appeals
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The initial response to increased appellate caseload was the creation
of the New Mexico Court of Appeals as an intermediate appellate court
responsible for disposition of a significant portion of the system's overall
direct appeal caseload. 17 In criminal matters, the supreme court retains
jurisdiction over first degree cases,'" applications for extraordinary relief,' 9
and discretionary jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by the court
of appeals. 20
Within the framework of the two-tiered system of appellate courts,
New Mexico has addressed the problems of increasing caseload and limited
resources by attempting to avoid-and rather successfully-the type of
case backlog which virtually paralyzes appellate practice in other jurisdictions. Two major innovations employed to assist in case management
have been the use of summary calendaring by the court of appeals in
the initial processing of appeals, 2' and the introduction of audio trial
transcripts to reduce costs and time delays associated with the production
of transcribed, written records of trial. 22 The latter innovation may ultimately be superseded by reliance on computer-generated transcripts which
achieve the goal of rapid transmission of the trial record while reducing
attorney
and court time.that is necessary to review audio transcripts.
The summary
calendaring system remains the most important device
employed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in caseload management.
Its efficiency and fairness have previously been assumed. A study published
in 1991 in Judicature23 and reprinted in the New Mexico Law Review is
highly supportive of summary calendaring as a means of maintaining the
court's traditionally rapid disposition time, 24 while noting apparent problems posed by the process. 25 The study is superficially correct in its

except those involving subject matter or procedure specifically reserved for the Supreme Court in
subsection(a)(l)-(5) or which are expressly directed for review in the Supreme Court by the state
constitution or action of that court.
17. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-102(B). The New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that
all appeals not designated for assignment to the Supreme Court "shall be taken to the court of
appeals." Id.
18. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-102(A)(2).
19. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-102(A)(5) (jurisdiction to consider appeals from writs of habeas
corpus); N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-503 (application for writ of error where appeal remedy inadequate);
N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-504 (jurisdiction over applications for extraordinary relief).
20. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-502 (certiorari jurisdiction to review cases decided by- Court of
Appeals).
21. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(D).
22. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-211 includes the use of audio-taped records of trial as the record
of trial for purposes of appeal. For a brief discussion of the impact of taped trial records, see
Thomas B. Marvell, Use of Tape Transcripts and Judge Substitutes, 75 JUDICATURE 95-96 (1991),
a short postscript to his longer article on the use of the summary calendar by the New Mexico
Court of Appeals. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. One of the most serious problems
associated with the use of audio tapes has resulted from inaudibility or mechanical failures in the
production of the taped transcript, a problem specifically addressed by subsection H of Rule 12211. See State v. Moore, 87 N.M. 412, 534 P.2d 1124 (Ct. App. 1975) (failure to produce adequate
taped transcript of proceedings requires new trial where reconstruction of record from agreed
recollections of trial counsel impossible).
23. Thomas B. Marvell, Abbreviated Appellate Procedure: An Evaluation of the New Mexico
Summary Calendar, 75 JUDICATURE 86 (1991); see also 22 N.M. L. REV. 502 (1992).
24. Id. at 94 ("Quantitative analysis indicates that the summary calendar, at least as applied to
criminal cases, leads to less overall delay at the court.").
25. Marvell concludes:
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conclusion: summary calendaring and disposition of appellate matters
without full briefing or reference to the trial record should almost certainly
result in rapid disposition. The question left unaddressed is whether the
process is truly efficient if factors associated with the concerns of a
system of justice, rather than simple processing, are considered.
Any critique of the summary calendar, as currently employed by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals, should consider not only the time involved
26
in disposition and number of cases disposed of per judge, but also
whether the system ensures both effective representation of criminal appellants by counsel and correct disposition of claims. Regrettably, the
court of appeals has opted for a system which does not provide these
constitutionally-mandated assurances to criminal defendants. Yet, alternatives are available which would not jeopardize the prompt disposition
of criminal cases-an important hallmark of a fair and just criminal
27
justice system and one that the court has actively sought to maintain.
The Right to Appeal in Criminal Cases
Although the Federal Constitution contains no express right of appeal
in criminal actions, 28 the United States Supreme Court has effectively
inferred the existence of a right to appellate review extending to all
29
criminal defendants when review is available in any criminal action.

A.

Perhaps the most objectionable (aspects of the New Mexico summary calendaring
process) are the lack of transcript and oral argument. Judges develop beliefs about
the necessity of specific procedures from individual experiences and customs in their
courts, and evidence that a procedure is more efficient is unlikely to change their
views about what aspects of appellate procedure are necessary to maintain proper
quality of review. We showed that reversal rates are not affected and that lawyers,
except criminal defense lawyers, do not object to the procedures.
Id. at 95.
26. Marvell's study, id., demonstrates a substantial increase in dispositions per appellate judge
with the corresponding introduction and increasing use of the summary calendar, with court of
1969 and 86 disposition; in 1990, and with
appeals judges averaging 32 dispositions per year in
disposition in 1990. Id.
two-thirds of the cases being decided by summary
27. See id. at 87 n.9 (noting that disposition time in the court of appeals remains at well under
one year, less than that typically required in other courts).
28. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (relying on McKane v. Durston for proposition that right of appeal in state proceedings
is not guaranteed by Federal Constitution).
29. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S 387 (1985), the
Supreme Court held that indigent state court defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel
on appeal, effectively overruling its much earlier decision in McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
(1894), in which the Court had expressly disclaimed that a right to appellate review exists in the
provisions of the Federal Constitution. Despite then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's argument in dissent,
relying on McKane as authority for the proposition that state court defendants continue to enjoy
no federal right of appeal, application of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
to counsel's performance on appeal virtually isolates Justice Rehnquist's position as effectively
rejected by the Court. More recently, in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) and Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Court has held that, because a right to post-conviction review
of criminal convictions is not of constitutional dimension, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
effective assistance in the prosecution of post-conviction claims will not be applicable to avoid
procedural default which results from counsel's ineffectiveness. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.
Ct. 2546, 2565-66 (1992). The logic of recent decisions suggests that the issue of a federal right to
some vehicle for appellate review of state court convictions has been resolved in favor of at least
a one-step right to appeal or review.
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Thus, while an indigent criminal accused has no expectation of a right
to appeal in the event of conviction as a matter of right under the
Federal Constitution, statutory or state constitutional recognition of appellate review as a matter of right will serve to afford all defendants
access to the appellate courts.30 Because the New Mexico Constitution
recognizes a criminal defendant's right to appeal from a state court
conviction, indigent criminal defendants are afforded the full range of
procedural rights available in order to effectively prosecute the direct
appeal in the state appellate courts.
1. Effective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal
The implied recognition of a right to appeal from a criminal conviction
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel through the direct
appeal. 3 ' In Swenson v. Bosler,3 2 the Court concluded that a Missouri
procedure permitting appointed counsel to withdraw froni representation
in non-frivolous appeals following the filing of a notice of appeal was
constitutionally defective, because it deprived indigents of assistance of
counsel in the prosecution of their appeals. Instead, appointed counsel
faced with the prospect of representation in an appeal presenting only
frivolous issues is required to research the record of trial and develop
potentially meritorious issues for the reviewing court's consideration."
The Court has balanced the role of the counsel as advocate3 4 and the
interests of state court systems in preserving limited judicial resources by
supporting procedures which recognize both counsel's independence in
representing the client and a duty to the appellate courts not to advance
non-meritorious claims. In Jones v. Barnes, 5 the Court concluded that
the indigent appellant retains no right to have counsel present or to have
counsel argue colorable claims if, in the attorney's professional judgment,
inclusion of issues lacking in probable success will prove detrimental to
overall prospects for success.3 6 In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin,3 7 the Court upheld a state procedural rule requiring counsel not
only to comply with Anders in fulfilling the duty of representation, but

30. N.M. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; N.M. R. App. PRoc. 12-202.
31. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
32. 386 U.S. 258 (1967).
33. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) ("Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and withdraw. That
request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished to the indigent and
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after
a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.").
34. Id. ("The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate on behalf of his client, as opposed
to that of amicus curiae .... His role as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to
the best of his ability.").
35. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
36. Id. at 752-53 n.6. The Court recognized that only a limited number of litigation decisions
are actually reserved to the client-the decision as to which plea is to be entered; whether jury
trial should be waived; and whether or not the client will testify in his own behalf. Id.
37. 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
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also to provide argument demonstrating the non-merit in potential issues
which are noted in the Anders-mandated review of the trial record.
The Court persists in requiring that appointed counsel serve as advocate
for the indigent criminal appellant,38 although it has balanced aggressive
representation with a recognition that the appellate process may constitutionally impose a duty on appellate counsel to assist in preserving
limited judicial resources. This goal may be achieved through restriction
of issues advanced for review both as a matter of general legal ethicsavoiding prosecution of frivolous claims-and as a matter of strategy
and tactics encouraged by skilled litigators, such as the decision to restrict39
the scope of appeal to those issues deemed most likely to be successful.
This latter approach, however, is not without criticism. The most pointed
criticism exists in the stinging dissent authored by Justice Brennan in
Jones v. Barnes.4°
New Mexico has specifically addressed the question of issue selection
by requiring counsel to present and argue meritorious issues in the brief
on appeal, while identifying other issues that were specifically requested
by the client .4 The treatment of counsel's duty by the New Mexico courts
suggests a greater appreciation for aggressive representation in state criminal appeals than that imposed by the minimal standards of the Federal
Constitution in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The
requirement that counsel advance issues not considered meritorious as

"Franklin" issues, 42 for instance, demonstrates greater concern for the
right of the accused to determine the course of the appeal than the
responsibility imposed in Jones v. Barnes.

38. Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1989).
39. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 115,
119 (1951); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266 (1981); John W. Davis,
The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940); and John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages
and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801 (1976). These sources were
relied upon by Chief Justice Burger in his majority opinion in Jones v. Barnes.
40. 463 U.S. at 764. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Chief Justice's limited recognition of
litigation decisions reserved to the individual defendant was drawn from the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility relating to the conduct of the trial by counsel, rather than appeal. Justice
Brennan looked to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice governing appellate strategy which
concluded that the final decision on prosecuting colorable, but unpromising points on appeal rests
with the client. In concluding, he observed: "I cannot accept the notion that lawyers are one of
the punishments a person receives merely for being accused of a crime." Jones, 463 U.S. at 75564 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan was not alone in expressing this position, being joined in his dissent in Jones
by Justice Marshall, and advancing a position also advocated by Justice Powell in his majority
opinion in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 (1981), in which an indigent criminal appellant
sued a public defender for malpractice as a result of her decision to withdraw from the appeal in
compliance with Anders. The duties of defense counsel, noted Justice Powell, included the duty to
advance all "colorable" claims in support of the indigent's appeal, while not advancing "frivolous"
claims which would serve merely to congest the courts unnecessarily.
41. State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 128-29, 428 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1967); State v. Boyer, 103
N.M. 655, 658, 712 P.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1985) (affirming Jones v. Barnes in principle based on
counsel's assertion of meritorious claims in brief, while reaffirming Franklin requirement that all
other issues be preserved in appellate brief).
42. State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967).
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2. Access to the Record on Appeal
Pivotal in the United States Supreme Court's implicit recognition of
a right of appeal for criminal defendants have been the Court's decisions
addressing the issue of indigent access to the trial record. In a series of
decisions, the Court held that indigent defendants could not be denied
access to state appellate review of their criminal convictions as a result
of their lack of economic resources. Thus, in Griffin v. Illinois, 43 the
Court held that an indigent unable to afford transcription of the trial
record in order to properly process an appeal could not be precluded
from state appellate review without violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."4 Subsequently, the Court held that requirement of prepayment
of filing fees, when applied to indigent criminal defendants, improperly
denied the defendants access to the state appellate courts in Burns v.
4
Ohio. 1
In a series of decisions, the Court looked at the following situations
concerning access to trial transcripts: (1) free transcripts were only provided to defendants who were able to convince the trial court that the
interests of justice would be "promoted" by their access to the record; 46
(2) free transcripts were only provided where the record was requested
by a public defender; 47 and (3) free transcripts were only available to
indigents who could show that their appeals were not frivolous." Finally,
the Court held that where a state system of post-conviction litigation
includes a right of appeal, an indigent must be afforded a free transcript
of the post-conviction writ hearing upon which to predicate his appeal.4 9
These decisions clearly establish that indigent criminal litigants cannot
be disadvantaged in their right to invoke the appellate process as a result
of their inability to pay the cost of transcription or preparation of the
trial record which will serve as the record on appeal.
At least superficially, the operation of the New Mexico summary
calendar does not offend the Equal Protection Clause as it has been
applied in decisions of the United States Supreme Court considering
availability of the record as a component of the appellate process. Rule
12-210(D)(1) of the appellate rules50 does not purport to limit access to
the trial record to indigents nor does the rule require a greater showing
of merit for indigent defendants who wish to obtain a copy of the trial
record than would be required for non-indigent appellants. Instead, the
rule expressly prevents the filing of the record in any case assigned to

43. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
44. Id. at 18.
45. 360 U.S. 252 (1959); see also Mitchell v. State, 112 N.M. 215 (1991) (right of indigent
defendant to appeal cannot be conditioned upon a statutory appeal bond requirement).
46. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
47. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 850 (1963).
48. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
49. Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
50. The rules of appellate procedure provide that when a case is placed on the summary calendar
"a transcript of proceedings shall not be filed." N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(D)(1).
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the summary calendar5' and applies to indigent and non-indigent criminal
appeals, as well as civil appeals,5 2 without reference to the status of the
litigant.
3. The Threshold Constitutional Question
There are obvious constitutional questions raised by rule 12-210(D)(1)
because it denies access to the trial record for cases placed on the summary
calendar." Clearly, were the summary calendar operating in New Mexico
only to deny indigent criminal defendants access to the appellate record,
the procedure would be subject to challenge under the Supreme Court's
holdings in the free transcript cases. 5 4 However, because the operation
of the summary calendaring procedure appears applicable to indigents
and non-indigents alike, no apparent equal protection violation is evident
from the language of the rule. 5
In practice, however, indigents are penalized by the denial of access
to the appellate record in two ways. First, counsel is generally unable
to provide the same level of appellate representation when he cannot
review the trial record. This argument is discussed more fully in succeeding
pages, but it clearly affects the Sixth Amendment rights of indigent
defendants and is not, at least superficially, an equal protection problem.
The second problem compounds the first because clients who are able
to afford reproduction of the transcript-particularly when the trial record
has been preserved by audiotape-are able to procure the record. Access
to copies of the taped or transcribed record affords counsel an advantage
in preparing the docketing statement upon which the initial calendaring
decision will turn, and in opposing the summary disposition proposed
once the case is considered by the court of appeals. In effect, summary
calendaring does suggest the existence of inequality of treatment of
indigent defendants by operation of the appellate rules in those cases in
which access to a transcript would enhance counsel's ability to both
create the docketing statement and oppose summary disposition.
In such cases, retained counsel able to afford the cost of trial record
preparation are placed in the more favorable position of providing counsel
with a full record upon which to develop factual and legal arguments.
To this extent, the summary calendar effectively operates to deprive

51. See State v. Duran, 96 N.M. 364, 365, 630 P.2d 763, 764 (1981) (where State attached trial
record as exhibit to brief, Supreme Court took judicial notice of exhibit while recognizing that
record could not properly be filed in court of appeals because case was assigned to the summary
calendar for disposition).
52. E.g., Garrison v. Safeway Stores, 102 N.M. 179, 180, 692 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Ct. App. 1984).
53. In Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit concluded that the New
Hampshire summary disposition system, which deprived the accused access to the record or a right
of argument in filing his petition for review, violated federal due process guarantees. Id. at 135.
54. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
55. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(DXi) ("If the case is placed on the summary calendar (1) a
transcript of proceedings shall not be filed.").
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indigent litigants of access to an appellate record in those cases in which
the appeal is initially deemed to be without merit by the court of appeals
in its decision to calendar the case for summary disposition.
B.

The Inefficiency Inherent in Summary Calendaring
The use of the summary calendar by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
as a means to expedite appellate review incorporates a number of features
of the appellate process which reduce, rather than enhance, efficiency in
processing criminal appeals. The negative features of this approach are
apparent in three components of the summary calendaring process.
1. Reliance on the Docketing Statement
First, the summary disposition of cases necessarily depends upon the
creation of a document separate from the notice of appeal.16 The "docketing statement ' 5 7 is a means of both advancing and limiting issues
presented for review 58 as well as offering supporting factual summary59
6
and legal authority for those issues advanced. w
The docketing statement requirement poses certain distinct problems
for trial and appellate attorneys, although in many respects it mirrors
standard procedure in other jurisdictions. For example, the notice of
appeal utilized in other jurisdictions may also require some discussion
of the evidence developed at trial and a statement of the issues to be
raised on appeal. 6' The critical difference lies in the fact that use of the
summary calendar means that a New Mexico appeal may be decided
almost exclusively on the information contained in the docketing statement
and issues raised by trial counsel, 62 unless appellate counsel successfully

56. N.M. R. ApP. PROC. 12-202 sets forth the requirements for filing the notice of appeal.
Timely filing of the notice of appeal is deemed a jurisdictional prerequisite for invocation of the
jurisdiction of the appellate court. State v. Martinez, 84 N.M. 766, 508 P.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1973).
57. N.M. R. APP. PROC. 12-208 sets forth the requirements for properly docketing the appeal.
58. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-208(B)(4) requires inclusion in the docketing a statement of the
issues presented in the appeal, including disclosure of the context in which the issues arose and the
means by which error has been preserved.
59. N.M. R. APP. PROC. 12-208(B)(3) requires the docketing statement to include a summary
of relevant facts supporting the issues presented by the appeal.
60. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-208(B)(5) requires counsel not only to list supporting authority, but
also authority contrary to the contentions presented on appeal. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin, 403 N.W.2d 449 (1987), 486 U.S. 429 (1988); Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co.,
102 N.M. 475, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1985).
61. See, e.g., CoLo. R. APP. PROC. 3 (requiring counsel to set forth statement of issues which
will be raised on appeal). In comparison, ARK. R. ApP. PRoc. 3(e) requires counsel to indicate
which portions of the transcript of trial have been ordered for purposes of appeal, but makes no
general requirement for a statement of issues. If, however, counsel designates only a partial transcript
for filing, subsection (g) requires a statement of points upon which the appellant intends to rely.
A general notice of appeal is the only instrument required to trigger the appellate process and
invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court in a Texas criminal appeal under TEx. R. ApP. PROC.
40(b). A cost bond or affidavit of inability to pay is the critical document for invoking the jurisdiction
of the appellate court in a civil action, pursuant to subsection (a) of the Texas rule.
62. State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781
P.2d 782 (1989) (issues are to be raised by trial counsel, not appellate counsel after picking through
the transcript for possible errors).

Winter 19941

NM COURT OF APPEALS' SUMMARY CALENDAR

contests the preliminary disposition 63 or is granted leave to amend the
statement to raise new issues.6
Consequently, neglect or error on the part of trial counsel in reconstructing the evidence 65 or in assessing the viability of potential issues
for appellate review may effectively doom the criminal appeal under New
Mexico procedure. In contrast, the typical process utilized in other jurisdictions focuses on the role of appellate counsel in researching the
trial record for support for colorable or meritorious issues which will be
included in the appellate brief.
Moreover, the inclusion of the docketing statement in the appellate
process as a second document which must be prepared by trial counsel
results in certain unnecessary delay. First, the notice of appeal itself must
be filed within thirty days after entry of the decision from which appeal
is taken.6 This time period may be extended by the trial court for an
67
additional thirty days on a showing of good cause. While a lengthy
period for filing the notice of appeal in civil cases may facilitate postjudgment settlement, no comparable delay is necessary in criminal actions.
In contrast to the thirty day period for filing in federal civil appeals,
subject to extension of up to sixty total days following entry of judgment,
the time for filing a notice of appeal by the defense in a federal prosecution
is ten days following entry of the order subject to appeal.6 Similarly
brief periods of time for filing the notice of appeal exist in other state
appellate systems. 69
Although the notice of appeal is a relatively simple document in New
Mexico, the thirty day period for filing, subject to extension by the trial
court, serves only to extend the due date for filing the much more
63. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(D)(3) provides that counsel opposing proposed disposition by
assignment to summary calendar has ten days to file memorandum in opposition demonstrating

need for contrary disposition or assignment to another calendar. State v. Sisneros, 98 N.M. 201,
202-03, 647 P.2d 403, 404-05 (1982).
64. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(D)(3) not only provides for contravening memoranda once
assignment is made to the summary calendar, but also permits amendment of the docketing statement
for "good cause shown with the permission of the appellate court." See State v. Rael, 100 N.M.
193, 195-97, 668 P.2d 309, 311-13 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983)

(discussing the proper approach for seeking leave to amend the docketing statement to raise new
issues once the case has been assigned to the summary calendar).
65. Since the statement of the evidence contained in the docketing statement is taken as correct
unless specifically challenged, State v. Anaya, 98 N.M. 211, 212, 647 P.2d 413, 414 (1982), any
failure of recollection by trial counsel is likely to result in one of two unfavorable consequences:
when facts critical to the defendant's position are omitted or stated in a less favorable light than
a fair reading of the trial record would indicate, the defendant's prospects for success on appeal
are compromised. Conversely, if trial counsel erroneously provides a statement of facts more favorable
to his client than warranted by a fair reading of the record, opposing counsel will be obligated to
challenge the inaccuracy if necessary in opposing summary disposition. Of course, advancement of
factual error in the docketing statement may also warrant imposition of sanctions against trial
counsel when warranted by the circumstances and nature of the error or omission. State v. Fulton,
99 N.M. 348, 657 P.2d 1197 (Ct. App. 1983).
66. N.M. R. App. PRoC. 12-201(A).
67. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-201(E). The time for filing the notice of appeal may also effectively

be extended by the filing of post-trial motions, pursuant to subsection (D) of this rule.

68. FED. R. App. PROC. 4(b).
69. See, e.g., ARK. R. App. PROC. 4(a) (notice of appeal due ten days from entry of order

appealed from).
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comprehensive docketing statement. The applicable rule permits trial counsel an additional period of some thirty days,7 0 again subject to extension,
but only by the appellate court 7 for filing the docketing statement.
The delay in filing the docketing statement, fixed by rule at sixty days
and easily subject to increase through motions for extension of time for
filing, means that reliance on the docketing statement prepared by trial
counsel as a critical element in the appellate process inherently delays
prosecution of the appeal. Particularly with the availability of taped and
computer-assisted written transcripts of proceedings which do not involve
extensive delay in preparation time, the allocation of the burden of
constructing the docketing statement on trial counsel necessarily infringes
on time that could otherwise be spent by appellate counsel in reviewing
the record and preparing the opening brief on appeal.
In fact, the sixty day delay for filing the docketing statement consumes
a period of time greater than that which would be required for full
review of the record and briefing by appellate counsel by simply shortening
the filing time for notice of appeal and ordering immediate transfer and
filing of the trial record in the court of appeals. The time allocated for
the creation and filing of the docketing statement under the current
system exceeds the fifteen day period for filing and the thirty days typically
available for filing the opening brief in an action assigned to the general
calendar, would be filed prior to the time allocated for creation and
filing of the docketing statement in the system currently in use. 72
The current use of the summary calendar is dependent on the filing
of the docketing statement by trial counsel, a procedure which delays
actual disposition of the appeal by extending the time before determination
of issues even begins. Errors, omissions or general unfamiliarity with the
law may all serve to seriously undermine the reliability of the docketing
statement as an instrument properly reflecting both the state of the
evidence and colorable claims raised in the proceedings below, requiring
further delay for correction at the calendaring stage and after. 73
Consequently, the advantages in terms of record preparation time which
result from technological innovation in the creation of the trial transcript
for use on appeal are compromised by the failure to fully utilize the

70. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-208(B).
71. See State v. Brionez, 90 N.M. 566, 566 P.2d 115 (Ct. App.), aff 'd, 91 N.M. 290, 573
P.2d 224 (1977) (trial court without jurisdiction to grant extension of time for filing docketing
statement after jurisdiction of appellate court invoked by filing notice of appeal).
72. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(B)(2); N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-210(C)(2) provides that cases
are assigned to disposition on the legal calendar when briefing involves disputed matters of law
only and the facts are not in dispute. See, e.g., State v. Ervin, 96 N.M. 366, 367, 630 P.2d 765,
766 (Ct. App. 1981) (case assigned to legal calendar for resolution of issue relating to proper
definition of term "dwelling house" where facts were not in dispute).
73. See Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 475, 480-81, 697 P.2d 156, 161-62 (Ct.
App. 1985) (court cites delay in disposition of appeal attributable to counsel's errors in failing to
fully set forth facts and contrary authority and opposing counsel's failure to file docketing statement
on cross-appeal).
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same advantages in the appellate process.74 This is particularly true when
neither trial nor appellate counsel rely on taped transcripts or computerassisted written transcripts in prosecuting the appeal, and are forced by
the nature of the summary calendar to rely on the recollection of trial
counsel and the client to reconstruct the issues necessary to prepare the
docketing statement.
2. The Calendaring Notice and Responsive Pleading
Second, the process requires preliminary review and proposed disposition
of the issues advanced in the docketing statement without full briefing
on the merits. At this point, summary calendarirgg is peculiarly flawed
because it operates to permit litigation by way of response to a calendaring
notice which recommends a proposed disposition by the party adversely
affected by the recommended disposition. 75 While the proposed disposition, which includes assignment of the case to the summary calendar,
may reflect a correct judgment on the issues as presented, opposing
counsel is afforded the opportunity to respond to the notice by offering
additional argument, as well as additional factual support not initially
included in the docketing statement 76 in support of the party's position.
Since filing of the appellate record is not ordered upon assignment of
a case to the summary calendar, appellate counsel-most typically the
Appellate Division of the New Mexico Public Defender Departmentare forced to respond to a proposed summary disposition without access
to the trial record.77 In order to properly represent the client's interest,
it is essential that appellate counsel ascertain whether the facts advanced
by trial counsel in the docketing statement are both accurately reported
and sufficiently comprehensive to include all relevant testimony and other
evidence necessary to properly apply controlling principles of law to the
evidence in order to render a proper disposition of the claims raised on
appeal.
In State v. Rael, the court of appeals rejected a motion to amend the

74. Counsel is under a duty to advise the appellate court in the notice of appeal whether or
not the transcript has been prepared by traditional methods or the proceedings were taped, pursuant
to N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-208(B)(6).
75. The applicable rule, N.M. R. App. PRoc. 12-210(D)(3), contemplates not only litigation on
the merits of issues raised in the docketing statement, but also litigation focusing on the appropriateness
of assignment of the case to the summary calendar for disposition itself.
76. State v. Sisneros, 98 N.M. at 202-203, 647 P.2d at 414-15 ("The opposing party to summary
disposition must come forward and specifically point out errors in fact and in law.").
77. The need to respond to the initial calendaring notice presents a problem not only in terms
of the need to explore both factual and legal claims before the court, but the sheer volume of
proposed summary dispositions may exhaust the resources of the Public Defender Department's
Appellate Division. The stress of expanding caseloads prompted a near open conflict between the
Public Defender and the Court of Appeals over case management difficulties occasioned by extension
requests sought by the Appellate Division in order to adequately respond to calendaring notices
issued by the Court. Lisa Driscoll, Confrontation Between COA & PD's Appellate Division Averted,
32 N.M. Bar Bull. 21 at 7-8 (May 27, 1993) (reporting diversion of funds from Public Defender
conflict cases budget to overload cases to provide private counsel representation in pending appeals
on contract from Public Defender Department).

40
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docketing statement filed on behalf of the defendant by appellate counsel.78
Counsel sought to amend the docketing statement to add the issue of
insufficient evidence to support conviction. The court denied the motion
and concluded that it was made "solely for the purpose of obtaining a
transcript or a copy of the proceedings, if taped." The court also stated
that this procedure is "not permissible, nor is it to be tolerated." 7 9
The Rael court's position on amending the docketing statement to
include new issues on appeal was succinctly stated in its conclusions:
At some point, trial and appellate counsel must find the courage and
integrity to be honest with the court and their clients regarding the
merits of an appeal; and that should be, we think, either before or
at the time of filing an initial docketing statement. 0
The problem with the court's position is that trial counsel is under
no duty or obligation by rule to contact appellate counsel to discuss the
merits of the appeal prior to the creation of the docketing statement.
Unless trial counsel initiates contact, appellate counsel has no way to
know if consultation is necessary or will prove valuable. The point at
which appellate counsel receives notice that further communication with
the trial attorney will be essential is with service of the calendaring notice
assigning the case to the summary calendar. Once the calendaring notice
is served, appellate counsel must then address the factual or legal issues
preliminarily disposed of by the appellate court in its calendar assignment
and initial disposition and then respond, when appropriate.
This process requires counsel to either contact trial counsel and the
accused directly within a ten day period to respond to the calendaring
notice, or to employ means outside the appellate rules to obtain and
review the record of trial. Since there is some cost for reproduction of
the trial record, even in the event that taped transcripts have been utilized
in the judicial district in which the trial took place, indigent clients are
effectively disabled from obtaining a trial record to benefit the work of
their appellate attorneys.
Once appellate counsel does respond to the calendaring notice with
either assertion of new factual grounds or legal authority, or successfully
moves to amend the docketing statement to raise new issues not previously
set forth in that document,8 ' the appellate court must evaluate the new
arguments and either respond with a second proposal for summary disposition or recalendar the cause for full briefing. In either event, additional
time must be spent by the court and its Prehearing Division to (a)
consider the arguments advanced by counsel opposing summary disposition

78. 100 N.M. 193, 197, 668 P.2d 309, 313 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d
308 (1983).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Olguin v. State, 90 N.M. 303, 563 P.2d 97 (1977); Linam v. State, 90 N.M. 302, 563 P.2d
96 (1977); and Vigil v. State, 89 N.M. 601, 555 P.2d 901 (1976) (supporting procedure of amendment
of docketing statement to permit litigation of new, colorable issues).
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and reach a decision and statement of grounds resulting in disposition
of the contentions, (b) issue a new calendaring notice setting forth additional rationale for summary disposition, or (c) reassign the case to
another calendar for full briefing, which would also include a briefing
on the full trial record if the cause is reassigned to the general calendar.
3. The Problem of Successive Calendaring Assignments
Once a case initially assigned to the summary calendar is successfully
litigated by opposing counsel, the system in place effectively generates
more delay than would be typical in a system relying on full briefing
of the trial record for all appeals. Assignment of the case for summary
disposition involves expenditure of judicial and attorney time. Rather
than resolving the case with a final decision, as would be the case after
a full briefing and a decision on the merits, the appellate court and its
prehearing staff are required to make a preliminary decision on the
merits. This decision is then subject to another round of litigation based
on the filing of the successive memorandum in opposition.
The time and resource savings envisioned by reliance on summary
disposition rapidly disappear if the initial proposed disposition is challenged. The successful challenge which leads to reassignment may result
from trial counsel neglect or error in failing to advance all colorable
issues-requiring amendment of the docketing statement for consideration
of issues not previously raised. Alternatively, the successful opposition
may also be predicated on trial counsel's failure to advance all facts
essential for disposition, or as a result of error in the legal interpretation
82
offered in support of the preliminary summary disposition.
The unnecessary delay resulting from operation of the summary calendar
is reflected in individual cases like State v. Richardson,83 which involved
the issuing of three different calendaring notices by the court of appeals,
and finally resulted in assignment of the case to the general calendar.
The record in Richardson demonstrates that the docketing statement was
initially filed on June 14, 1991. Other calendaring notices were also filed
on July 3, 1991, September 27, 1991 and November 1, 1991, with the
first notice proposing summary affirmance, the second proposing summary
reversal based on an amendment to the docketing statement to include
a new issue, and the third assigning the case to the general calendar for
full briefing.
The record on appeal was finally completed and filed on January 9,
1992 with briefing concluded by the parties on March 31, 1992. Six
months later, the case was finally decided in an opinion issued by the

82. For instance, in State v. Anaya, 98 N.M. 211, 213-14, 647 P.2d 413, 415-16 (1982), the
state supreme court reversed the summary reversal of conviction based on insufficiency of the
evidence offered in support of the State's case at trial. The supreme court concluded that reversal
on insufficiency was inappropriate in light of the jury verdict convicting the defendant and recitation
in the State's memorandum brief in opposition of facts showing a positive eyewitness identification
of the defendant and remanded the cause for reassignment to a "proper" calendar.
83. 114 N.M. 725, 845 P.2d 819 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 550, 884 P.2d 130 (1992).
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court of appeals. The delay was compounded by the grant of a thirty-

day extension for filing the docketing statement after thirty days had
expired between the entry of judgment and filing of the notice of appeal.
A consequence of this delay and additional delay attributable to requests
by appellants' counsel and the Attorney General was to extend the time
for filing memoranda in opposition and for time given to briefing. The
court's decision was finally issued almost three years after the defendant
was initially charged in December, 1989, and more than two years after
his conviction on July 20, 1990. 4
Certainly, the pattern of delay evidenced in Richardson is not typical,
yet it is a direct product of the use of a calendaring system that requires
counsel to speculate on the conduct of the trial because of denial of the
appellate record. Nor are successive calendaring notices rare in the operation of the summary calendar.85 Once litigation over the content of
the trial record or existence of meritorious issues not reflected in the
docketing statement commences in response to the proposed summary
disposition, the smoothness of the calendar envisioned by the court in
its appellate rules and decisions" is no longer reflected in the actual
conduct of the case.
C.

Interference with Effective Assistance of Counsel
The role of appellate counsel, as envisioned in indigent criminal appeals
by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Barnes, is to provide effective and
efficient representation based upon counsel's best professional judgment.
The Jones opinion deferred to counsel's professional judgment regarding
strategy in the selection of points for inclusion in the brief on appeal,
rather than preserving any right on the part of the accused to dictate
strategy. 87 Proper discharge of the role of appellate counsel as "active

84. Information provided by internal departmental memorandum filed by Assistant Appellate
Defender Susan Gibbs to Appellate Defender Sheila Lewis dated Oct. 7, 1992 (on file with the
author).
85. See, e.g., State v. Baca, No. 14089 (N.M Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1992) (second calendar notice
issued, case remaining reassigned to summary calendar, with summary affirmance proposed), cert.
denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85 (1993); State v. Charlton, 115 N.M. 35, 846 P.2d 341 (Ct.
App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 577, 844 P.2d 827 (1993) (second calendar notice issued, case
remaining assigned to summary calendar with defendant's motion to amend docketing statement
"granted" with summary affirmance of conviction proposed and summary affirmance and reversal
as to sentence proposed); State v. Jackson, No. 14069 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1992) (second
calendar notice issued, case remaining assigned to summary calendar with affirmance proposed),
cert. denied, 115 N.M. 795, 858 P.2d 1274 (1993).
. 86. E.g., State v. Anaya, 98 N.M. at 212, 647 P.2d at 414 ("We believe
that assignment to
the summary calendar .. . is proper in cases where the application of legal principles to the facts
involved is clear and where no genuine issue of substantial evidence is involved.").
87. Other courts and commentators advocate a different approach, that of deferring to the
client's directive after disclosure of counsel's professional judgment on the likely merits of questionable
points of error and the prospects that inclusion of these points in the brief on appeal may dilute
the overall strength of the brief. See NLADA Standards for Appellate Defender Offices, Standard
1(0)9 (1980), which states:
Each appellate defender office should adopt clearly articulated procedures for
dealing with clients who desire to raise individual issues in cases which the attorney
believes to be without arguable merit. Such procedure should be sufficient to insure
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advocate" 8 8 requires counsel to review the trial record in assessing the

merits of the client's case 89 and then advance those issues warranting

review on the merits by the appellate court. 90 The operation of the

summary calendar interferes with counsel's exercise of professional judgment in two specific respects, both of which result in unnecessary complication of the disposition process.
1. The Problem of Lack of Access to the Trial Record
The most critical problem posed by counsel forced to respond to a

summary calendaring assignment is the inability to know what happened
at trial. This is a problem also shared by the appellate court due to its
forced reliance on trial counsel's representations in the docketing statement

or contrary assertions set forth in a memorandum in opposition. 91

Traditionally, the court of appeals has discouraged any access to the
trial transcript once a case has been assigned to the summary calendar

for disposition. The court cautions against submitting opposing memoranda designed to obtain a transcript that would permit counsel to "pick
through the transcript for possible error." 92 Recent action by the court
demonstrates, however, its own lack of fidelity to reliance solely upon

docketing statements or facts asserted in controverting memoranda. For
that the issue desired by the client is presented to the appellate court in an appropriate
manner so as to receive the serious attention of the court. It is preferable to have
counsel include the issue in the brief submitted, if at all possible.
Some state courts have adopted the same approach. See- Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d
585, 591 (Mass. 1981) (holding that counsel should raise issues desired litigated by client by
"preserv[ing] the contention succinctly in a brief in a way that will do the least harm to the
defendant's case."); accord State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967); State v. Boyer,
103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1985).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has taken an approach inconsistent with its holding
in Jones v. Barnes regarding capital cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, urging
counsel to raise and reviewing courts to provide "careful scrutiny in the review of every colorable
claim of error." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
88. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
89. Id.
90. STANDARDS FOR CRUAINAL JUSTICE,

§ 21-3.2(b) (ABA 1986) provides:
(i) Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional evaluation of
the questions that might be presented on appeal ....

Counsel should endeavor to

persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous appeal, or to eliminate contentions
lacking in substance.
(ii) If the client chooses to proceed with an appeal against the advise of counsel,
counsel should present the case, so long as such advocacy does not involve deception
of the court. When counsel cannot continue without misleading the court, counsel
may request permission to withdraw.
91. For example, in State v. Olloway, 95 N.M. 167, 168, 619 P.2d 843, 844 (Ct. App. 1980),
the court considered an issue relating to sufficiency of the evidence adduced to support appellant's
conviction for receiving stolen property. The court initially assigned the case to the summary calendar,
proposing summary affirmance. Subsequently, the case was recalendared, this time proposing summary
reversal. Following response by the State to this proposed disposition, the court authored an opinion
affirming the conviction, finally relying on statements of the evidence contained in the defendant's
docketing statement to conclude that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the conviction.
92. State v. Jacobs, 91 N.M. 445, 450, 575 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M.
491, 576 P.2d 197 (1978), overruled by State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 128-30, 782 P.2d 91, 100102 (Ct. App. 1989) (also noting court's general disfavor toward addition of issues on appeal not
included in the docketing statement while recognizing utility of expanding time frame for filing
motions to amend docketing statements to raise" new issues when case assigned to non-summary
calendar for briefing).
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example, in State v. Montoya,93 the court directed counsel for the parties
to "listen to the tapes" of a witness' testimony and "file in this court
a stipulated written transcript of the relevant portions of that testimony
within 14 days of this order." 94 This order modifies typical procedure
in a summary calendar case, but it also imposes another period of delay
in the resolution of the appeal. This delay would not be necessary if the
trial transcript had been filed in the court of appeals in the first place.
Similarly, in State v. Baca,95 the court's calendaring notice specifically
noted that the defendant and trial counsel were unable to recall a particular
fact, but further observed that there was "no indication that appellate
counsel has attempted to have trial counsel review, or that she herself
has attempted to review the transcript to determine the material facts
pertinent" to an issue subject to a motion to amend the docketing
statement.9 In State v. Jackson,97 the court in its second calendaring
notice rejected appellate counsel's argument concerning an exhibit because
the exhibit had not previously been presented to the court in support of
counsel's legal issue. The court directed supplementation of the record
with the exhibit and applicable testimony, 98 despite the fact that the
appellate rules allow exhibits to be filed only in actions assigned to the
general calendar. 99 Interestingly, in support of its order, the court's
calendar notice cites State v. Jim'00 for the proposition that defendant
bears the burden of providing a record sufficient for review of the issues
raised on appeal. 0 1 This criticism is hardly fair in light of the fact that
the court's own calendaring assignment worked to deprive counsel, and
the decision-making panel, of a complete trial record upon which the
case could properly be decided.
Lack of precision in the understanding of the testimony and additional
evidence adduced at trial is particularly troubling when appellate counsel
is forced to address any of four distinct aspects of criminal appeals.
a. Sufficiency of Evidence Challenges
Challenges based on insufficient evidence are particularly important in
the prosecution of criminal appeals because a finding of evidentiary
insufficiency requires reversal and acquittal under the Fifth Amendment's

93.
- N.M.
-, 860 P.2d 202 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85 (1993).
94. State v. Montoya, No. 13837 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1992) (interim order).
95. No. 14089, (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1992), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709, 858 P.2d 85 (1993).
96. Id. (second calendar notice at 3).
97. No. 14069, (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1992), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 795, 858 P.2d 1274
(1993).
98. Id. (second calendar notice at 5). ("If defendant desires to again contest this issue, he is
instructed to supplement the record proper with the presentence report in his memorandum in
opposition and to provide this court with the alleged testimony in support of his position.").
99. N.M. R. APP. PROC. 12-212.
100. 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491
(1988).
101. Id.
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protection against double jeopardy. 0 2 The state's burden is to adduce
evidence sufficient to establish or prove each element of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed from the perspective
of a rational trier of fact. 0 3
Without access to the full record of trial, however, appellate counsel
cannot make an independent determination as to whether sufficient evidence was adduced at trial, or whether the summary of evidence included
in the docketing statement is accurate or complete to permit a correct
assessment. °4 Evidentiary insufficiency questions are equally troubling to
the court of appeals, 05 particularly in light of the fact that a jury has
found the evidence sufficient in reaching a collective decision to convict.'°6
In State v. Charlton,1°7 the court's second calendaring notice addressing
the sufficiency question indicated the perception of the calendaring judge
that appellate counsel was under some duty to review the trial transcript
in asserting her client's position in response to the proposed disposition.
The notice also indicated that six additional issues had been raised in
response to the original proposed disposition relating to sentencing matters
and that defendant's claims were, at least in part, meritorious and deserving summary reversal. °8 Appellate counsel partially grounded her
sufficiency argument on the fact that trial counsel did not prepare the
docketing statement and it was, therefore, inherently suspect. The calendar
notice includes the following response:
Defendant suggests that because the attorney who prepared the docketing statement was not the attorney who represented him at trial this
issue (sufficiency) should not be affirmed on the summary calendar.
(M.I.O. 2) Defendant appears to contend that this case should be

102. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). But see Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (no

right to application of double jeopardy bar when reversal based on error in admission of evidence,
even though in absence of improperly admitted evidence totality of evidence would have been
insufficient for state to meet its burden of proof).
103. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

104. This concern is occasionally shared by the appellate courts. In State v. Lopez, 107 N.M.
450, 760 P.2d 142 (1988), Justice Walters, a champion of summary calendaring while a member
of the Court of Appeals, observed:
We agree, as the calendaring notice indicated, that an appellate court must review
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State in determining whether the
evidence at trial supports conviction, and that an appellate court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the jury (citation omitted). But we are perplexed in
determining how the court could have reviewed the evidence when, on summary
disposition, it did not have a transcript of the trial before it. An appellate court
cannot make a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence when it has not
reviewed the evidence presented at trial unless the facts of the docketing statement
clearly establish no doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
105. State v. Olloway, 95 N.M. 167, 168, 619 P.2d 843, 844 (1980).

106. State v. Anaya, 98 N.M. 211, 212, 647 P.2d 413, 414 (1982).
107. 115 N.M. 35, 846 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 577, 884 P.2d 827
(1993).
108. State v. Charlton, No. 14070 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1992) (second calendar notice at 23). These included challenges to an order purporting to "banish" the defendant as part of the
sentence imposed in the case which the calendaring judge concluded contravenes public policy.
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placed on the general calendar to review the transcript of proceedings
in order to determine what evidence was introduced at trial. However,
there is no indication that the attorney who prepared the docketing
statement did not have an opportunity to discuss the case with trial
counsel or have access to the transcript of proceedings. Nor is there
any indication that appellate counsel was unsuccessful in seeking to
have trial counsel review, or that she herself has attempted to review
the transcript, by reviewing the court reporter's notes to determine
what evidence was presented.109

Even the calendaring court was unable to rely upon factual representations
made in the docketing statement as accurate and complete." 0 Moreover,
while non-filing of the trial record is an additional measure taken to
achieve the goals of cost and time reduction, the second calendar notice
issued in Charlton effectively directs appellate counsel to surreptitiously
review the record in order to discharge her duty to the court and client.
The more reasonable approach in this situation would have been to assign
the case to the general calendar so that counsel would have access to
the trial record instead of engaging in the delaying process of repetitive
calendar notices and memoranda filed in opposition.
b. Grounds Preserved for Appellate Review
One problem in determining whether an issue should be advanced on
appeal involves the proper preservation of error in the trial court.", This
is particularly true when alternative theories may be advanced in support
of a single proposition, such as when state constitutional provisions afford
greater protection for a criminal accused than comparable provisions of
2
the Federal Constitution."
The docketing statement must identify issues raised for appeal and
indicate the means by which error was preserved in the trial court." 3
However, the docketing statement is created by trial counsel subsequent
to the trial and is subject to a filing date of up to sixty days after entry
of judgment," 4 excluding extensions of time granted for filing of either

109. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
110. State v. Calanche, 91 N.M. 390, 574 P.2d 1018 (Ct. App. 1978) ("When a case is assigned
to the summary calendar, the facts in the docketing statement are accepted as true unless contested.").
111. N.M. R. APP. PROC. 12-216; State v. Casteneda, 97 N.M. 670, 642 P.2d 1129 (Ct. App.
1982) (point of error advanced on appeal must be based on ruling of trial court on same point).
112. For example, in State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1991), the court
considered the defendant's claim that he had a greater expectation of privacy in the area outside
the curtilage of his home, under Article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, than that
recognized under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The claim was raised in the
docketing statement, but not preserved at the hearing on the pretrial motion to suppress. Id. at
454, 816 P.2d at 523. The court addressed the issue on the merits despite the failure of preservation.
Subsequently, in State v. Allen, 114 N.M. 146, 835 P.2d 862 (Ct. App. 1992), the court held that
failure to argue state constitutional provisions in the trial court waived this theory for relief on
appeal.
113. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-208(B)(4).
114. N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-201(A) requires that notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after
entry of judgment. Rule 12-208(B) then requires the filing of the docketing statement within thirty
days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Thus, up to sixty days may pass before the docketing
statement is actually filed.
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document."' If error is preserved by written motion and ruling, counsel
should be able to demonstrate the grounds relied on in the trial court.
But when issues involve errors allegedly committed during the course of
the trial itself, such as the admission or exclusion of evidence, trial
counsel is more likely to rely on personal recollection in setting forth
the means by which error was preserved. This process invites either an
inaccurate representation of the preservation process as a result of imprecision in recollection or expansion in the docketing statement of theories
supporting the issue when counsel is able to supplement reflection with
reference to caselaw, statutory and rules provisions, and constitutional
guarantees.
Appellate counsel is obligated to argue preservation based on the
information supplied in the docketing statement or as a result of postcalendaring conversations with trial counsel. If an issue has been improperly or inadequately preserved or counsel has erred in his personal
recollection of the theories urged in the trial court, appellate counsel
may argue the issue as if it were properly preserved below, whereas a
review of the trial transcript would demonstrate that the issue was not
properly preserved for appellate review. The exercise of appellate counsel's
best professional judgment is compromised in those situations in which
denial of access to the record fails to afford counsel a full appreciation
for the actual state of the record as to the nature of the issue, supporting
testimony and preservation efforts undertaken by counsel.
c. Fundamental Error
New Mexico retains a significant body of caselaw devoted to fundamental error. The caselaw includes certain errors occurring during trial
which are not reflected in the record proper on appeal, ' 6 such as improper
comment on the accused's silence." 7 The failure of trial counsel to properly
preserve error, however, does not itself constitute fundamental error so
that the unpreserved error becomes subject to appellate review."18
The problem posed by the potential commission of fundamental error
is that without review of the trial transcript, appellate counsel cannot
reasonably determine whether such error might have occurred at trial
from the docketing statement. Counsel, unaware of the violation involved
and therefore failing to interpose a timely objection, may not be sufficiently advised by the time of preparation of the docketing statement
to recognize the error. Assuming that the fundamental error doctrine

115. Counsel may obtain an extension time for filing the notice of appeal from the trial court
for thirty days for good cause shown under N.M. R. App. PROC. 12-201(E)(l).
116. N.M. R. APP. PROC. 12-209(A) sets forth the required contents in the record proper.
117. See State v. Martin, 101 N.M. 595, 686 P.2d 937 (1984); State v. Ramirez, 98 N.M. 268,
648 P.2d 307 (1982).
118. State v. Lott, 73 N.M. 280, 387 P.2d 855 (1963). Such error may be sufficiently egregious
to constitute ineffective assistance under federal and state constitutions, affording the accused a
new trial, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), or serving as "cause" for failure
to properly exhaust state remedies excusing procedural default for purposes of federal habeas review.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487-88, 492 (1986).
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protects those rights that are central to a fair trial even in the absence
of timely and correct action by trial counsel," '9 denial of access to the
record of trial precludes a proper evaluation by appellate counsel as to
whether or not certain errors of a fundamental nature in fact did occur.
d. Effective Assistance Assessments
The entitlement to effective assistance of counsel requires an appropriate
forum for vindication of violation of the right. 120 Often, a question of
ineffectiveness may be so intertwined with the conduct of the trial that
a correct assessment as to the trial counsel's performance or competence
may be made on the trial record itself. Other deficiencies in performance
conducted in the
will require an evidentiary hearing most appropriately
2
context of a collateral attack on the conviction.' '
Although the litigant is entitled to raise a claim of ineffectiveness by
post-conviction action, appellate counsel may often make a well-considered
judgment as to the assistance afforded at trial reflected in the transcript
of proceedings. Summary calendaring not only precludes this preliminary
assessment from being made by appellate counsel, but also insulates
ineffectiveness from disclosure and relief, because counsel performing
incompetently at trial may well perform with equal lack of ability or
concern when creating the docketing statement.
2. Issue Selection
The core of the majority's approach to counsel's duties in Jones v.
Barnes lies in a recognition of the professional judgment counsel may
bring to the determination regarding which issues should be argued on
appeal.' 22 The operation of the summary calendar, however, frustrates
counsel's exercise of professional judgment in correctly assessing which
issues should be argued vigorously, which should be abandoned upon
and which should be included in the briefs
consultation with the client,
23
as "Franklin" issues.
The court of appeals has repeatedly condemned the practice of counsel
"pick[ing] through the transcript for possible error,"' 24 yet New Mexico's

119. State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 P.2d 464 (1978) (appellate court under duty to reverse on
issues of demonstrated fundamental or jurisdictional error); State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 130,
782 P.2d 91, 102 (Ct. App. 1989) (new issues of fundamental or jurisdictional error may be raised
in appellate brief being supported by good cause).
120. State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1979) (claim of ineffectiveness may
be raised as a matter of fundamental error).
121. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); State v. Stenz, 109 N.M. 536, 539, 787 P.2d
455, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) (limiting circumstances in which remand for evidentiary hearing on
permissible remedy for lack of sufficient record to evaluate ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal);
State v. Powers, 111 N.M. 10, 800 P.2d 1067 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Ill N.M. 16, 801 P.2d 86
(1990) (indicating preference for litigation of ineffectiveness claims requiring evidentiary hearing by
post-conviction action); State v. Gomez, 112 N.M. 313, 316, 815 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 112 N.M. 279, 814 P.2d 457 (1991) (defendant's claim of inadequacy of interpreter lacking
in factual basis in the record, and more properly litigated in post-conviction action for relief).
122. 463 U.S. at 752-53.
123. State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 128, 428 P.2d 982, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 (1969).
124. See, e.g., State v. Jacobs, 91 N.M. at 450, 575 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91
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published decisions are replete with references to abandonment of issues
included in the docketing statement which have not been fully briefed
in a case either originally assigned or reassigned to the general calendar. 125
The fact that appellate counsel routinely abandon issues advanced by
trial counsel in the docketing statement 26 demonstrates the extent to
which appellate counsel in New Mexico exhibit that exercise of professional
judgment relied upon in Jones v. Barnes.
The problem posed by the summary calendar is that, uncertain of the
accuracy of factual representations made in the docketing statement as
to the nature of the evidence or preservation effort made by counsel,
cautious appellate counsel will likely err in favor of urging an issue,
rather than abandoning it. This means that undue litigation results from
advancement of appellate issues in the docketing statement asserted by
trial counsel. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be independently tested
by appellate counsel to determine their viability without an opportunity
to review the trial transcript or record of proceedings. Moreover, counsel
may attempt to expand issues on appeal through a motion to amend the
docketing statement based upon representations made by the client or
trial counsel which ultimately would prove non-meritorious when the case
is reassigned to a calendar for full briefing on the trial record.' 27
Access to the record of trial serves to permit counsel to search for
meritorious issues which may be raised on appeal but have not been
included in the docketing statement. It also facilitates evaluation of less
colorable claims. A fuller understanding of the lack of merit in many
issues advanced in the docketing statement permits counsel to advise the
client of the wisdom in abandoning meritless claims and instead focusing
the court's attention on issues suggesting more favorable prospects for
relief.
CONCLUSION
Operation of the New Mexico summary calendaring procedure offers
superficially attractive advantages of expedition of the appellate process
with concomitant savings of judicial time and costs associated with preparation of the trial record. In reality, the summary calendar entails
significant hazards for the criminal appellate process by depriving litigants
of the most effective representation which can be afforded by appellate
N.M. 491, 516 P.2d 297 (1978); State v. Rael, 100 N.M. 193, 197, 668 P.2d 309, 313 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983); State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 128, 782 P.2d
91, 100 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (1991).
125. See, e.g., State v. Sandoval, 88 N.M. 267, 539 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M.
637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977); State v. Scott, 90 N.M. 256, 561 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 486 (1977); State v. Herrera, 90 N.M. 306, 563 P.2d 100 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 363, 567 P.2d 100 (1977); State v. Ortiz, 90 N.M. 319, 563 P.2d 113 (Ct. App.
1977).
126. State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 632, 634, 788 P.2d 932, 934 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M.
563, 787 P.2d 1246 (1990); State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
102 N.M. 734, 700 P.2d 197 (1985) (counsel's decision not to brief issues constitutes abandonment).
127. See, e.g., State v. Munoz, Ill N.M. 118, 802 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Ill N.M.
136, 802 P.2d 645 (1990) (counsel's failure to brief issue subject to motion to amend docketing
statement despite directive to brief b6th issue and motion for amendment, results in rejection of
motion to amend and rejection of relief on merits of issue).
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counsel.' 28 Denial of access to the record of trial precludes the most
efficient utilization of attorney time, and often results in issuance of
successive calendaring notices which extend, rather than shorten, the time
required for disposition of criminal appeals.
In considering alternative approaches to streamlining the appellate process, the American Bar Association (ABA) rejected the use of devices
designed to pre-screen or eliminate frivolous appeals because they were
viewed as "impracticable" and "unsound" in principle.12 9 Instead, the
ABA has promoted efforts to streamline appellate case processing by
endorsing expedited appeals "so long as they continue to ensure that the
judges are adequately informed as to the facts and the proceedings
below ... .*"10 A working understanding of the New Mexico summary

calendaring process demonstrates the accuracy of the ABA concern that
any device designed to pre-screen or expedite a criminal appeal should
ensure that meritorious issues are not compromised by the device.

128. In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Supreme Court held that operation of a
state procedural rule requiring an accused to testify first if intending to testify in his own defense
served to render representation ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. The underlying rationale
of the Court's ruling was that the rule impaired counsel in the exercise of his best professional
judgment by requiring that the testimony decision be made without opportunity to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of other defense witnesses having already undergone cross-examination.
Denial of access to the trial record poses the same type of procedural restriction on the exercise
of professional judgment by appellate counsel, who must litigate in a virtual vacuum, and may
subject the New Mexico calendaring system to a similar Sixth Amendment attack.

129.

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINA.L JUSTICE,

130. Id. § 21-3.4(a).

§ 21-2.4 & cmt. (ABA 1986).

